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W ITH THE ADVENT of the hyperbaric chamber, a new and po-
tentially hazardous method of therapy has been intro-
duced into clinical practice. The application of this method of
therapy in clinical use may be classified, at least in some in-
stances, as experimental. Although many authorities agree that
hybaroxia may be useful in the treatment of certain diseases,
facilities to carry out such therapy just have not been available.
However, upon theoretic grounds hybaroxia may be useful in
many diseases.
With the construction of such sophisticated facilities as the
hyperbaric chamber now contemplated, it might be well to seek
out possible legal pitfalls in the application of high pressure oxy-
gen equipment in the treatment of suspected or proved diseases
in the human.
A comprehensive discussion of the law as it applies to hy-
baroxia must include design, manufacture, installation, inspec-
tion, and use of the facility involved, also, the liability of the
manufacturer, of the hospital, and of the physician. Legal liter-
ature reveals few cases in which these facets of the law have
been discussed with special regard to the hyperbaric facility.,
Therefore one is forced to review principles of the common law
and to apply them to hybaroxia, or refer to statutory provisions.2
Permission of the Patient
One of the basic rights extended to everyone under the com-
mon law is freedom from intentional touching of his person.8
There are numerous unavoidable trespasses that are a product
*M.D., LL.B.; Dept. of Anesthesiology, Cleveland Clinic; Assoc. Prof.,
Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
** M.D.; Dept. of Anesthesiology, Cleveland Clinic.
*** M.D.; Dept. of Anesthesiology, Cleveland Clinic.
1 Beatty v. Foundation Co., 222 N. W. 77 (Mich. 1928); Taylor v. List &
Weatherby Const., 146 So. 353 (La. 1933); Maryland Casualty v. Gerlaski,
68 F. 2d 497 (5th Cir. 1934).
2 Boycott, G. W. M. 35 J. Hyg. 318; 9 Zentralbl. f. Gewerbehyg. 250.
3 Prosser, Law of Torts 33 (3rd ed. 1964).
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of modern life, such as unintentional touching in a crowded bus
or elevator. 4 When getting a haircut or having clothes fitted, the
touching of the person is intentional, but permission to touch is
to be implied. Somewhere beyond these areas, intentional touch-
ing becomes a battery. Meticulous care is exercised by hospital
administrators and surgeons to obtain authorization to operate
before the patient reaches the surgical theater. One could hardly
imagine a more violent trespass to the sanctity of the person than
an unpermitted contact of the surgeon's scalpel, of the anesthe-
siologist's syringe of pental sodium, or of confinement in a hyper-
baric chamber.
The grant of permission to intentional touching of the per-
son constitutes a defense in actions against the physician. The
case law on the duty of the physician to inform his patient con-
cerning surgical or medical treatment may be extended to hy-
baroxia.
American Jurisprudence states that "the relation of physi-
cian and patient is a consensual one, and that in the absence of
emergency or unanticipated conditions a physician or surgeon
must first obtain the consent of the patient, if he is competent to
give it, or of someone legally authorized to give it for him, before
treating or operating on him." 5 However, certain exceptions
have been made to this general rule of law. Should such a rule
be enforced strictly, it may only serve to endanger the very per-
son it sought to benefit-the patient. There are many situations
in the complex field of medicine today where express consent as
executed in a formal and legalistic method employed in most
institutions becomes impractical.6
Restatement of Torts, Section 62, provides that an invasion
of an interest of personality of another who has not consented
thereto does not give rise to liability if (1) the other is physically
4 Wiffin v. Kincaid, 2 Bos. & Pul. (N. R.), 471, 127 Engl. Rep. 713 (1807);
Coward v. Baddleley, 4 Hur. & Nor. 478, 157 Engl. Rep. 927 (1859); McAdams
v. Windham, 208 Ala. 492, 94 S. 742, 30 A. L. R. 194 (1922); Gibeline v. Smith,
106 Mo. App. 545, 80 S. W. 961 (1904); Note, 14 U. of Cinc. L. R. 161 (1940);
Wasmuth, C. E., Consent to Surgical Procedures, 6 Clev-Mar. L. R. 235
(1957); Wasmuth, C. E. and Oleck, Howard L., The Privilege of Consent, 36
Anesthesia and Analgesia, 51 (November-December 1957).
5 41 Am. Jur. 193.
6 Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N. W. 444, 76 A. L. R. 551 (1931);
Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N. W. 12, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 439 (1905);
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92,
52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 505 (1914); Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E.
2d 754, 56 A. L. R. 2d 686 (1956).
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or otherwise incapable of giving consent, or the consent of an-
other having power to act for him cannot be obtained for any
other reason, (2) an emergency has arisen which makes it actu-
ally or apparently necessary to invade the interest before there
is an opportunity to obtain consent, (3) the invasion is or is rea-
sonably believed to be so manifestly to the other's advantage
that a reasonable man would give his consent if he had the op-
portunity to do so, and (4) the actor neither knows nor has rea-
son to know that the other would not give his consent were there
an opportunity to ask for it. The surgical operation in which un-
toward conditions are discovered making it necessary to extend
the operation or to perform a different operation from that con-
sented to is given as an example of invasion that does not give
rise to liability.
Must the surgeon limit his operation to that operation that
was specifically outlined to the patient? Or, may the surgeon, in
order further to benefit the patient, extend the operation? The
North Carolina Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Parrott, held that,
under the modern view, the specific consent of the patient was
unnecessary. In that case, the court held that the surgeon was
authorized to extend the operation to any abnormal condition in
the area of the original incision when this is necessary for the
welfare of the patient and is the approved practice of surgeons
generally. It stated:
While the law of contracts is applied as between a patient
and his physician or surgeon, when a person consults a phy-
sician or surgeon, seeking treatment for a physical ailment,
real or apparent, and the physician or surgeon agrees to ac-
cept him as a patient, it does not create a contract in the
sense that term is ordinarily used... The patient selects, and
commits himself to the care of the doctor because he is con-
fident the doctor possesses the requisite skill and ability to
treat . . . his physical ailment... The physician, after diag-
nosing the ailment, prescribes the treatment or the medicine
to be administered; but the patient is under no legal obliga-
tion to follow the physician's instructions. Thus it is apt and
perhaps more exact to say it creates a status or relation
rather than a contract...
Prior to the advent of the modern hospital and before an-
esthesia had appeared on the horizon of the medical world,
the courts formulated and applied a rule in respect to oper-
ations which may now be justly considered unreasonable
and unrealistic. During the period when our common law
was being formulated and applied, even a major operation
May, 1965
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was performed in the home of the patient, and the patient
ordinarily was conscious, so that the physician could consult
him in respect to conditions which required or made ad-
visable an extension of the operation. And even if the shock
of the operation rendered the patient unconscious, immedi-
ate members of his family were usually available. Hence
the courts formulated the rule that any extension of the op-
eration by the physician without the consent of the patient
or someone authorized to speak for him constituted a battery
or trespass upon the person of the patient for which the phy-
sician was liable in damages.
However, now that hospitals are available to most people in
need of major surgery; anesthesia is in common use... More
and more courts are beginning to realize that ordinarily a
surgeon is employed to remedy conditions without any ex-
press limitation on his authority with respect thereto, and
that in view of these conditions which make consent im-
practical, it is unreasonable to hold the physician to the ex-
act operation-particularly when it is internal-that his pre-
liminary examination indicated was necessary. We know
that now complete diagnosis of an internal ailment is not
effectuated until after the patient is under the influence of
the anesthetic and the incision has been made.
7
When the patient is unconscious, and has not consented to
such treatment, does hyperbaric therapy come within the pur-
view of any consent that may have been given by the patient be-
fore his treatment? Cases in point are extremely few. However,
there may be authority for the use of hybaroxia in the imme-
diately postoperative period. The courts usually have held that
consent for an operation has authorized a surgeon to take such
additional steps as were necessary to repair or to correct condi-
tions caused by the surgery.8 Admittedly, this is an extensive
elaboration upon the original holdings of these cases, yet the
principle at law remains identical.
In addition, it is generally recognized that emergency con-
ditions in which immediate action is necessary for the protection
7 Ibid; see also: Jackovach v. Yocom, supra, n. 6; King v. Carney, 85 Okla.
62, 204 P. 270, 26 A. L. R. 1032 (1922); Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A. 2d 626(D. C. Mun. App. 1943); Bennan v. Parsonet, 83 N. J. L. 20, 83 A. 948 (1912);
Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P. 2d 257 (1931).
s Preton v. Hubbel, 87 Cal. App. 2d 53, 196 P. 2d 113 (1948): "The Law
should encourage self reliant surgeons to whom patients may safely entrust
their bodies and not men who may be tempted to shirk duty for fear of a
law suit, and a surgeon is not required to perform every operation accord-
ing to plans and specification approved in advance by the patient and care-
fully tucked away in an office safe for court room purposes"; Higley v. Jef-
frey, 44 Wyo. 37, 8 P. 2d 96 (1932); Barnett v. Bachrach, supra, n. 6; Ken-
nedy v. Parrott, supra, n. 6.
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of life may justify an implication of consent to medical and sur-
gical treatment where it is impractical to obtain actual consent
from the patient or one authorized to consent for him. This prin-
ciple has been applied to the situation where there is actual con-
sent to treatment in some form, and in the course of such treat-
ment the physician or surgeon is faced with unanticipated emer-
gency conditions threatening the patient's life or health. 9
Permission to place the patient in the hyperbaric chamber
for the treatment of an emergency condition is implied. In mod-
ern case law, one can find adequate authority for the proposition
that in the dire emergency, consent to treatment is implied.
Thus, we find the gradual changing of the old rule concern-
ing consent, and a relaxation of the stultifying provisions, all
brought about by the ever-increasing pace of medical and scien-
tific programs. Today it may be stated that while consent to a
surgical procedure must be given by the patient, once given such
consent may be enlarged to include new and approved diagnostic
and therapeutic medical technics. The case law is following the
philosophy, as embodied in the ancient Latin maxim: Ratio est
legis anima; mutata legis ratione mutatur et lex. (Reason is the
soul of the law; the reason of the law being changed, the law is
also changed.)
When the hyperbaric chamber is to be used as the primary
course or mode of treatment, express consent of the patient must
be secured. When the use of increased ambient pressures is used
secondarily or incidental in the course of treatment, the neces-
sity of express consent becomes less absolute when the patient
is aware of such possible treatment. Whenever possible, how-
ever, the physician should inform the patient or the patient's
relatives of the possible or contemplated use of the new facility
and secure permission to use it.
Thus, we find authority for the use of hybaroxia in these
situations: (1) where the patient expressly consents, (2) where
the patient impliedly consents, (3) where the patient consents
to a surgical operation and hybaroxia is necessary or may be
necessary as an extension, (4) where the patient is unconscious
and his condition requires the immediate use of such a thera-
peutic facility.
9 Mohr v. Williams, supra, n. 6; see also, 56 A. L. R. 2d 699 (1957); Valdiz v.
Percy, 35 Cal. App. 2d 485, 96 P. 2d 142 (1939); Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S. W.
2d 474 (Ky. 1951); Hively v. Higgs, 120 Ore. 588, 253 P. 363, 53 A. L. R. 1052
(1927); Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N. J. L. 20, 83 A. 948 (1912).
May, 1965
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Informed Consent
Recently, the doctrine of informed consent has been intro-
duced into the medical malpractice action. By virtue of this doc-
trine, the physician is required to outline to the patient and/or
the family the risks of the proposed treatment. This duty is an
elaboration of the common law requirement of a negligence ac-
tion, i.e., the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in the
treatment of the patient. Ordinarily, the plaintiff, in a malprac-
tice action, must plead and prove (1) the duty of care of the phy-
sician, (2) the breach of the duty of care, (3) that the breach of
duty was the proximate cause of the injury, and (4) the dam-
ages. The duty to exercise care and skill is defined as that de-
gree of care and skill exercised by the reasonable prudent physi-
cian in the same or similar locality. In cases involving informed
consent, the courts have stated that a physician must explain to
the patient the suggested treatment. In this short series of cases
of informed consent the exercise of ordinary care has been deter-
mined to include an explanation of a method of treatment that,
under the particular fact situation, requires such detailed de-
scription because of: (1) the methods inherent hazards, and/or,
(2) its use constitutes the innovation of the method or technic
into the treatment of a certain disease or dysfunction, and/or,
(3) the experimental nature of the method of therapy, and, (4)
the decision of the patient of an established method of therapy
vis-a-vis the new experiment and hazardous method of therapy
recommended.
In a review of the cases applying this doctrine, it becomes
evident that the doctrine is reserved, or should be reserved, for
cases involving new and hazardous technics.
In our opinion the proper rule of law to determine whether
a patient has given an intelligent consent to a proposed form
of treatment by a physician compels disclosure by the phy-
sician in order to insure that an informed consent of the
patient is obtained. The duty of the physician to disclose,
however, is limited to those disclosures which a reasonable
medical practitioner would make under the same or similar
circumstances. How the physician may best discharge his
obligation to the patient in this difficult situation involves
primarily a question of medical judgment. [Italics not in
original publication.] So long as the disclosure is sufficient
to insure an informed consent, the physician's choice of plau-
sible courses should not be called into question if it appears,
all circumstances considered, that the physician was moti-
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss2/9
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vated only by the patient's best therapeutic interest and he
proceeded as competent medical men would have done in
a similar situation.10
In this same case the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas
in clarifying its former opinion stated ". . . that the patient was
entitled to a reasonable disclosure by the radiologist so that she
could intelligently decide whether to take the cobalt irradiation
treatment and assume the risks inherent therein, or, in the alter-
native, to decline this form of precautionary treatment and to
take a chance that the cancerous condition in her left breast had
not spread beyond the lesion which had been removed by sur-
gery." n
Thus, we find that the application of the doctrine of informed
consent, in this case, was limited. Cobalt-60 teletherapy was a
new technic to medical practice. Few patients had ever heard
of such equipment or treatment. In addition, inherent in this
technic were many hazards. The doctrine of informed consent
was limited (1) to the application of new and hazardous tech-
nics and, (2) to the patient who must elect: (a) whether to
undergo the new and hazardous treatment, or, (b) to decline the
treatment and to take the chance that other more conservative
and tried therapeutic technics would suffice.
The use of the hyperbaric chamber as a method of therapy
fits precisely within the limitations of the doctrine of informed
consent. Hybaroxia is a new technic being introduced into the
practice of medicine, though the use of the principle is centuries
old. Although considerable basic research has been carried on
in the hyperbaric chamber, and although considerable clinical
10 Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P. 2d 1093, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P. 2d
670 (1960); see also, Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S. E. 360 (1918);
Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S. W. 2d 11 (Mo. 1960); Steele v. Woods, 327 S. W.
2d 187 (Mo. 1959).
11 Natanson v. Kline, supra, n. 10.
(Note: In this case a woman, suffering from cancer of the breast, had a
radical left mastectomy performed, and then employed a radiologist to ad-
minister radiation therapy. Before treating the patient with radioactive co-
balt the radiologist made an explanation of the risks involved. There was
no immediate emergency at the time the treatment was administered, and
the woman suffered injuries because of the treatment. The court held that
the patient was entitled to a reasonable disclosure by the radiologist so that
she could decide whether to take the cobalt irradiation treatment and as-
sume the risks, or to decline this precautionary treatment and take a chance
that the cancerous condition in her left breast had not spread beyond the
lesion which had been removed. When the radiologist gave his patient no
explanation whatever, on this state of the record, he failed in his legal duty
to make a reasonable disclosure to her as a matter of law.)
May, 1965
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research has been or will in the near future, be carried on in the
hyperbaric chamber (whereby humans will be subjected to
these conditions), in the minds of some authorities, the thera-
peutic advantages may be questionable. Still others, less familiar
with the modern facilities, believe that the risk involved in ther-
apy far outweighs the therapeutic advantages. Caution must be
exercised, therefore, even in the discriminate use of the hyper-
baric facility, particularly where hybaroxia is of limited or ques-
tionable advantage.
The public is familiar with situations similar to the physical
forces involved in hybaroxia. Popular publications frequently
contain elaborate discussions of skin diving and scuba diving.
Many persons are acquainted with such terms as "bends," "rap-
ture of the deep," and "caisson disease," though it is questionable
whether this popular knowledge may be transferred to and re-
lated with the patient who is about to undergo hyperbaric treat-
ment.
Therefore, outside of emergency situations, treatment in a
hyperbaric facility must be discussed with the patient or the
relatives. The nature of the chambers should be explained, the
reasons why such therapy is advised, and some of its dangers.
Sufficient information should be given, so that the patient's de-
cision can be based upon a rational and comprehensive knowl-
edge of the risks involved. It is recommended, therefore, that
in the use of the hyperbaric chamber the patient and/or his near-
est relative sign a consent that grants to the physician and to the
hospital permission to utilize this method of therapy upon the
person of the patient. The following form is suggested:
Hyperbaric Chamber Therapy (Consent Form)
This is to acknowledge and certify that Dr. (full name) has
explained to me the nature of the condition or disease from
which I suffer and, has outlined to me the usual methods of
treatment. In addition, Doctor (last name) has suggested to
me the possible advantages of treating this condition or dis-
ease by the use of increased air pressure and that this treat-
ment is possible only within the hyperbaric chamber.
I, understand fully: (1) that the Hyperbaric Chamber is a
large steel tank in which the air pressure can be increased
to 45 pounds per square inch; (2) that I will be placed with-
in this chamber in the care of competent nurses and/or phy-
sicians; (3) that all reasonable care and skill will be exer-
cised in the operation of the facility; (4) that due to the use
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss2/9
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of increased pressures that I am exposed to certain hazards
such as:
(a) increased risk of fire;
(b) pain in the sinuses, ears, bones, teeth (due to the
trapping of air while being compressed);
(c) possible entrapment of air in the lungs upon de-
compression;
(d) possible bubble formation in the blood and/or tis-
sues upon decompression;
(e) the toxic effects of nitrogen and oxygen under in-
creased pressures.
However, in consideration of the possible benefits to be de-
rived by myself in the treatment of the disease or condition
from which I suffer, I hereby authorize and instruct Doctor
(last name) and/or his associates to carry out this new and
potentially dangerous form of therapy upon me.
Witness Patient
Spouse or Relative
RelativeWitness
Some case reports suggest that a physician is under no duty
to warn his patient of possible harmful effects of the treatment
when he has reason to believe that the health of the patient will
be adversely affected by such warning. However, it would be
hazardous for the physician, contemplating the use of the hyper-
baric chamber, to apply such a rule of law in the use of the latter
facility.' 2 It is a recognized exception to the rule of informed
consent that the patient need not be informed of the added risk
of the new and hazardous method of therapy when, in the judg-
ment of the treating physician, such disclosure is not in the best
interest of the patient.'3
12 Govin v. Hunter, 374 P. 2d 421 (Wyo. 1962).
'3 Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P. 2d
170 (1957): "A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects him-
self to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the
basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment.
Likewise the physician may not minimize the known dangers of a procedure
or operation in order to induce his patient's consent. At the same time, the
physician must place the welfare of his patient above all else and this very
fact places him in a position in which he sometimes must choose between
(Continued on next page)
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It is sometimes said that, when qualified physicians serving
in the same or similar localities do not as a rule disclose the pos-
sibilities of danger to the patient, such consent and explanation
is not necessary. Because of the recent decisions involving the
necessity of disclosure of dangers to new and hazardous technics
in the treatment of patients, this rule might not be applicable to
such situations. 14
The Supreme Court of Kansas stated:
... Anglo-American law starts with the promise of thorough-
going self-determination; each man is considered to be mas-
ter of his own body and he may, if of sound mind, expressly
prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other
medical treatment, and while a doctor might well believe
that an operation or form of treatment is desirable or neces-
sary, the law does not permit him to substitute his own judg-
ment for that of the patient by any form of artifice or de-
ception.
It follows, therefore, that under ordinary circumstances a
physician must acquaint his patient or someone properly
acting for him of the diagnosis or treatment proposed and,
having obtained the approval of his patient, must then pro-
ceed in accordance with proper and reasonable medical
standards and with due care.15
Liability of the Physician for Malpractice
After the patient consents to a method of treatment, the
physician owes the continuing duty to exercise reasonable care
and skill. Moreover, the patient assumes the risks that are in-
(Continued from preceding page)
two alternative courses of action. One is to explain to the patient every risk
attendant upon any surgical procedure or operation, no matter how remote;
this may well result in alarming a patient who is already and duly appre-
hensive and who may as a result refuse to undertake surgery in which
there is in fact minimal risk; it may also result in actually increasing the
risk by reason of the physiologic results of the apprehension of itself." The
others recognized that each patient presents a separate problem, that the
patient's mental and emotional condition is important and in certain cases
may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a certain amount
of discretion must be employed consistent with full disclosure of facts
necessary to an informed consent. See also, Mitchell v. Robinson, supra,
n. 10.
14 79 A. L. R. 1028 2d (1961).
15 Natanson v. Kline, supra, n. 10. See also: Roberts v. Woods, 206 F. Supp.
579 (S. D. Ala. 1962). (Physician was not liable to the person for failing to
advise her of all hazards involved in thyroidectomy, where patient's emo-
tional state and concern over operation, as well as another operation to be
(Continued on next page)
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herent in this method of therapy. However, the patient does not
assume the risk of treatment that is performed negligently by
the physician.
It is incumbent upon the plaintiff, in a malpractice action,
to plead and to prove (1) the standard of care of other physi-
cians within the same or similar locality and in the same or sim-
ilar circumstances; (2) the breach of the standard of care, or,
that the act complained of did not fit within the standards of care
and skill as set down by the other physicians within the same or
similar community; (3) that the negligent act was the proximate
or direct cause of the damage that the patient suffered.
The defendant's conduct in a particular case is a pure ques-
tion of fact. How he should have conducted himself is a pure
question of law. But because the law has not undertaken to de-
fine exactly and specifically what a person should do in all pos-
sible circumstances, the question of what conduct amounts to
due care in a particular case, and the question of whether the
defendant's conduct does or does not equal such conduct, are
usually not separated. The question of negligence, therefore, is
a mixed question of fact and law.
It has long been settled that a defendant will not be held
liable for consequences which are so far removed from the chain
of causation that the causal connection becomes merely conjec-
tural. Such consequences are called remote, in counterdistinc-
tion to near, or proximate, consequences. However, the defend-
ant is prima facie liable at least for consequences which might
have been foreseen by a prudent reasonable man in the position
of the defendant, and a rule of legal cause holds him liable only
for such consequences.
Therefore, in regard to a hyperbaric chamber, it is incum-
bent upon the institution and the physicians in charge of such or
a similar facility to have established a standard of procedure.
(Continued from preceding page)
performed at the same time, would have made full disclosure detrimental);
Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P. 2d 292 (1963). (Doctor has no obli-
gation to describe in detail all possible consequences of treatment, since to
make complete disclosure of all facts, diagnoses, and alternatives or possi-
bilities could so alarm patient that it would constitute bad medical practice);
Woods v. Brumlap, 71 N. M. 221, 377 P. 2d 520 (1962). (Exception to the
rule regarding disclosure of dangers of treatment in an emergency while
the patient is in no condition to determine for himself, or where explana-
tion of every risk may result in alarming a patient who is already appre-
hensive and who may refuse treatment in which there is minimal risk,
which may be increased by disclosure).
May, 1965
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Such standard should take into consideration the strict rules
concerning compression, duration of compression, conduct with-
in the hyperbaric area, preparation of supplies for use in the hy-
perbaric area, maintenance in care of the hyperbaric facility and
regulations for operation of the hyperbaric facility. In the prep-
aration of such standard operating procedures, many excellent
sources are available. 16
Standard Operating Procedure
The properly prepared Standard Operating Procedure should
anticipate all possible complications of increased ambient pres-
sure.17 First of all, personnel must be certified for employment
within this facility only after a complete physical examination
including, but not limited to, hematologic studies and radiologic
examinations of lungs and long bones. Routine periodic qualify-
ing reexaminations must be a prerequisite for continuing em-
ployment. The prospective patient to undergo hybaroxia should
be screened before admission to the hyperbaric chamber by hav-
ing a complete medical history taken and a physical examination
as well as preliminary roentgenograms of the chest and the long
bones performed. The patient who presents the possibility of
having trapped air within the lungs may suffer serious compli-
cations upon decompression. This complication serves to illus-
trate and to bring into proper focus the absolute necessity for
adherence by the entire staff and personnel to the standard de-
compression tables as set down either in the United States Navy
Diving Manual or those contained in the New York State Regu-
lations Concerning Work in Compressed Air.
The effects of increasing barometric pressure may cause in-
jury to the body because of the inability to equalize pressure
between a closed air space and the ambient atmosphere.'" If an
16 U. S. Navy Diving Manual 1959, Navy Department of Washington, Nay-
ships 250-538; Submarine Medicine Practice, Bureau of Naval Personnel
1956, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.; Proceedings
Second Symposium on Underwater Physiology 1963, National Academy of
Sciences, National Research Counsel, Publication 1181, Washington, D. C.
17 Alt, F.: Pathologie der Luftdruckerkrankungen des Gehoerorgans, Verb.
dtsch. Olol. Ges. 1897 6:49-61; Smith, Andrew H.: The effects of high at-
mospheric pressure, including the caisson disease (Brooklyn, Eagle Print,
1873); Friedrich, W., and Tauszk, F.: Die Erkrankung der Caisson arbeiter
Wien, Klin. Rdsch. 10:233-235; 249-250; 267-268, 287-288; 323-324 (1896);
Philip, M.: Des accidents aureculaires chez les travailleurs des Caissons.
Gaz. heb. Sci. Med., 28:206-212 (1907).
18 Requarth, W. H. and Benson, R. E.: Compressed air illness with special
reference to the middle ear, 9 Industrial Medicine 115 (1940); Almour, R.:
The "blocked ear" of the caisson worker, 52 Laryngoscope 75 (1942).
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss2/9
14 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
air space within the body has a rigid or semirigid wall, it must
be equalized by the free entry of air.1 9 Measures to prevent or
to treat the conditions known as aerotitis media and sinusitis
should be outlined. The question of consent for myringotomy
arises, particularly in the unconscious patient. The prepressure
myringotomy might be an assault upon a patient where a healthy
portion of his body is operated upon to try to prevent a compli-
cation of the method of therapy.
Decompression Effects
Personnel operating the facility must be familiar with the
diagnosis and treatment of decompression complications as (1)
the bends, (2) pulmonary (chokes), (3) integumental, (4) cen-
tral nervous system, (5) eye, (6) ear, (7) bone and joint in-
volvement.
Inasmuch as the physician places the patient in a position of
jeopardy, it is incumbent on him to have adequate facilities
available to treat the complications of decompression. A recom-
pression chamber capable of being pressurized to 90 p.s.i. must
be immediately available. 20 In the event that a patient dies with-
in the hyperbaric chamber or immediately after hybaroxic ther-
apy, an autopsy should be performed if at all possible. When
consent is not obtained from relatives, statutory authority, when
available, may be invoked.
Res Ipsa Loquitur (The Matter Speaks for Itself)
To establish a prima facie case (or, to get the case to the
jury) without the testimony of a medical expert, one may resort
to the procedural effects of the rule of res ipsa loquitur, informed
consent or common knowledge. When applied to a malpractice
action, these procedural devices allow an inference at law to be
created which requires consideration by the jury. Seldom have
courts permitted the application of these procedural technics to
medical malpractice actions. However, there is a trend in recent
years, to liberalize former positions of the court. The increasing
use of res ipsa loquitur exemplifies the growing recognition of
19 Haines, H. L.: Aero-otitis media in submarine personnel, 17 J. Acoust.
Soc. Amer. 136 (1945); Harris, J. D.: Auditory acuity in severe aero-otitis
media, 17 J. Acoust. Soc. Amer. 139 (1945).
20 U. S. Navy Diving Manual, supra, n. 16.
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the courts of special situations that arise from the particular re-
lationship of patient and physician.
21
The facts of the occurrence alone are sufficient to present a
prima facie case . . .the results may be of such a character
as to warrant the inference of want of care . .. in the light
of the knowledge and experience of the jurors themselves. 22
This, unfortunately, is the trend of judicial philosophy in
several jurisdictions today. In these areas, the courts have be-
come more acutely aware of the need to protect an injured pa-
tient by inducing the physician to explain the reason for the
injury or suffer the penalty of an adverse inference in the ab-
sence of such explanation. Contrariwise, many conservative
jurisdictions limit the application of res ipsa loquitur.
A doctor's constant contact is with the frailties, idiosyn-
crasies, physical and mental weakness, and allergies of
human nature. They may affect the condition, and yet are
beyond his control. 23
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been applied in mal-
practice cases where there have been injuries to healthy or hith-
erto unaffected areas of the patient's body occurring during the
course of medical treatments. 24 However, the law regarding
these injuries is not entirely clear.
The majority of jurisdictions apply the doctrine where the
injury was of unusual character and where laymen could say it
would not have occurred if due care been exercised. The doc-
trine has been applied particularly in instances where the patient
was unconscious.
In some instances involving injuries to a patient from the
use of a mechanical device under the management or control of
the physician or surgeon it has been recognized that the occur-
rence or the injury raises a presumption or inference of negli-
gence on the part of the defendant, or, renders the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur applicable. However, the conditions requisite
for the application for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are (1)
the accident must be of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in
21 Cho v. Kemplar, 177 Cal. App. 2d 342, 76 A. L. R. 2d 774 (1960); Ybarra
v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 687, (1944); 93 Cal. 2d 43, 208 P. 2d
445 (1949).
22 Cho v. Kemplar, supra, n. 21.
23 Morgensen v. Hicks, et al., 110 N. W. 2d 563 (Iowa 1961).
24 Ybarra v. Spangard, supra, n. 21.
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the absence of someone's negligence, (2) it must be caused by
an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant, and (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.
25
Most laymen who are familiar with scuba diving or under-
water construction work can appreciate the hazards inherent in
a hyperbaric chamber. The very thought of enclosing a patient
in a steel tank and increasing the pressure within the tank might
lay very heavily on a juror who suffers from claustrophobia.
Should the plaintiff's attorney use the leverage of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur or the doctrine of common knowledge to get his
case to such a juror, the outcome of the decision might depend
wholly upon such a juror's vote.
In addition, the plaintiff's attorney may classify the use of
the hyperbaric chamber as an experimental method of treatment.
This introduces into an already complex legal picture the still
unsettled question of clinical research. According to the basic
law of negligence, it is the duty of the treating physician to use
that degree of skill and care, and therefore methods and tech-
nics, as would a reasonable prudent practitioner use in the same
specialty and in the same community under the same or similar
circumstances. 26 However, this is not interpreted so strictly as
to preclude the use of new methods of therapy:
Although it is the duty of a physician or surgeon to keep up
with the advancement made by his profession, it is also his
duty to refrain from trying experiments on his patients. It
is incumbent upon him to conform to the mode established
by his school of practice for the treatment of given condi-
tions, and if he departs therefrom he does so at his own peril.
Where only one course of treatment would be approved by
physicians or ordinary skill, the adoption of any other course
may evidence want of ordinary negligence, skill, or care.
This does not, however, limit him to the most generally used
of several approved modes; and the use of another mode
known and approved by the profession is in exercise of prop-
er care. A physician may adopt new methods as they are
approved by the profession. This qualification gives to the
profession the opportunity to make progress after the experi-
25 Cavero v. Franklin Gen. Benevolent Society, 36 Cal. 2d 301, 311, 223 P.
2d 471 (1950); see also Ybarra v. Spangard, supra, n. 21.
26 Wasmuth, C. E.: Physician's liability when using new or experimental
drugs, 31 Cleveland Clinic Quarterly (April 1964); see also: Wasmuth, The
use of experimental drugs and technics, 43 Anesthesia and Analgesia 2
(1964).
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mental stage in the development of a new method is passed,
but it does not authorize the trying of untested experiments
on patients; and if an experiment is tried on a patient, it is
at the financial risk of the physician rather than of the pa-
tient.27
Therefore, the law recognizes that medicine is a progressive sci-
ence. In determining the degree of care and skill which the law
exacts of physicians and surgeons, due regard must be paid to
the state of the advancement of the science at the time of the
treatment. The treatment is to be measured by the standards
existing at the time in question and not those that may have ex-
isted in the past. Therefore, it may be stated that the physician
is not bound to use any particular method of treatment and, if
among physicians of ordinary skill and learning, more than one
method of treatment is recognized as proper, it is not negligence
for a physician to adopt any of the such methods. The fact that
some other method of treatment exists or some other physician
or surgeon might or would have used or advised another and
different treatment does not of itself establish negligence or im-
proper treatment. However, the method followed and adopted
if a proper method, the physician must use ordinary skill and
care in treating his patient.
Manufacturer's Liability
According to the common law, the manufacturer or seller of
a product is liable in a negligence action only to the person who
can establish privity of contract. Stated in another way, the sell-
er of a product is responsible for injuries caused by the product
only to the person to whom he has sold it.2" However, privity of
contract has been disregarded in many cases, and as a result we
have several exceptions to the general rule. The first one was
the "inherently dangerous product" exception, and, soon to fol-
low, food and drugs were excluded.2 9 Of more recent origin is
the "imminently dangerous product" exception to the privity
requirement. Justice Cardozo in the case of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Car Company stated:
27 Miller v. Toles, 183 Mich. 252, 150 N. W. 118 (1914); see also: Hodgson v.
Bigelow, 335 Pa. 497, 7 A. 2d 338 (1939).
28 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. and W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
29 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
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If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain
to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is
then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the con-
sequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there
is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons
other than the purchaser and used without new tests, then,
irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of
danger is under a duty to make it carefully. That is as far
as we are required to go for the decision of this case. There
must be a knowledge of a danger, not merely possible but
probable. It is possible to use almost anything in a way that
will make it dangerous if defective. That is not enough to
charge the manufacturer with a duty independent of his con-
tract. Whether a thing is dangerous may be sometimes a
question for the court and sometimes a question for the jury.
There must also be knowledge that in the usual course of
events the danger will be shared by others than the buyer.
Such knowledge may often be inferred from the nature of
the transaction. But it is possible that even knowledge of
the danger and of the use will not always be enough. The
proximity or remoteness of the relation is a factor to be
considered. We are dealing now with the liability of the
manufacturer of a finished product, who puts it on the mar-
ket to be used without inspection by his customers. If he is
negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will
follow.3 0
The "imminently dangerous product" exception is based upon
the broad ground that an article, although not inherently dan-
gerous, may become so when put to its intended use. Therefore,
the manufacturer or the seller owes to the public a duty to em-
ploy reasonable care, skill, and diligence in its manufacture. 3 1
Thus, if a product contains a defect that renders it dangerous
when applied to its intended use in the usual and customary
manner, it has become an imminently dangerous product.3 2
There are numerous exceptions to the rule of privity which
are well-founded in the law. These exceptions include explo-
sives, poisons, food, drugs, and other inherently dangerous prod-
ucts. There is little in the law concerning the application of the
doctrine to medical devices. In this particular situation, medical
30 MacPherson v. Buick Motor, 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050, L. R. A. 1916 F.
696 (1916).
31 Gorman v. Murphy Diesel, 42 Del. 149, 29 A. 2d 145 (1842); see also,
Hunter v. Quality Homes, 45 Del. 100, 68 A. 2d 620 (1949).
32 Goullon v. Ford Motor, 44 F. 2d 310 (6th Cir. 1930); Borg Warner Corp.
v. Heine, 128 F. 2d 657 (6th Cir. 1942); Miles v. Chrysler Corp., 238 Ala. 359,
191 So. 245 (1939).
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equipment is purchased by the hospital or by the physician for
use upon a patient. If the patient has been injured by faulty
medical equipment, can he reach the manufacturer of the equip-
ment on his implied or expressed warranty? The core of the
question is whether the manufacturer or seller may be held liable
for injury caused by such a product to one other than the pur-
chaser of the product. It is clear that there can be no recovery
for injury caused by medical equipment when the product was
not actually harmful or defective at the time when the manufac-
turer or seller was responsible for it.33 However, if the manufac-
turer knew or should have known that the product might cause
injury, then the manufacturer has the duty to notify and to ad-
vise the physician or the ultimate consumer of these dangerous
propensities of the product. 34 Thus, we find ample authority to
establish that the manufacturer of hyperbaric chambers and
equipment are responsible not only to the institutions to whom
they sell the equipment but also ultimately to the patient who
is treated within the hyperbaric chamber. Should any defective
construction be found, liability becomes absolute.
Hyperbaric Chamber Construction
The installation and utilization of the hyperbaric facility for
the administration of oxygen to patients under increased atmos-
pheric pressures presents several medical and legal problems. 35
Before 1905, boiler explosions had been regarded either as an in-
evitable evil or "an act of God." In 1908, the State of Ohio
passed legislation entitled the Ohio Board of Boiler Rules, which
was patterned after the Massachusetts statutes.36 Other states
33 Nelson v. Swedish Hospital, 241 Minn. 551, 64 N. W. 2d 38 (1954); Mar-
kulics v. Maico, 74 Cal. App. 2d 66, 168 P. 2d 35 (1946); Blissenbach v. Yanko,
90 Ohio App. 557, 48 Ohio Ops. 203, 107 N. E. 2d 409 (1951); Smith v. Ameri-
can Cystoscope Makers, 44 Wash. 2d 202, 266 P. 2d 792 (1954). Contra:
Bowles v. Zimmer Manufacturing Co., 277 F. 2d 868, 76 A. L. R. 2d 120 (7th
Cir. 1960); Lindroth v. Walgreen Company, 407 Ill. 121, 94 N. E. 2d 847 (1950);
Walstrom Optical Co. v. Miller, 59 S. W. 2d 895 (Tex. 1933); Orthopedic
Equipment Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F. 2d 455, 79 A. L. R. 2d 390 (4th Cir. 1960).
34 Harmon v. Plabao Laboratories, 218 S. W. 701 (Mo. 1920); LaFrumento v.
Kotex Co., 131 Misc. 314, 226 N. Y. S. 750 (1928); Cleary v. John Maris Co.,
173 Misc. 954, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 38 (1940); Poriser v. Wappler Electric Co., 147
Misc. 317, 260 N. Y. S. 35 (1932).
35 Wasmuth, Carl E.; Homi, John, Hyperbaris Oxygen chambers, 13 Clev.-
Mar. L. R. 436 (Sept. 1964).
36 Chuse, Robert: Unfired Pressure Vessels, Dodge Corporation (4th ed.
1960).
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began to formulate rules and regulations to control the manufac-
ture as well as the operation of boilers. As regulations differed
from State to State and often conflicted with one another, manu-
facturers began to find it difficult to construct vessels for use in
one State that would be accepted in another one. Because of this
lack of uniformity, an appeal was made in 1911 both by manu-
facturers and by the users to the Council of the American Soci-
ety of Mechanical Engineers to correct the situation. After three
years of study, the first American Society of Mechanical Engi-
neers Rules for Construction of Stationary Boilers and for Al-
lowable Working Pressures was adopted in 1915.37
Subsequently, the boiler manufacturers, with the chief in-
spectors of the states and cities that had adopted the ASME code,
formed the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspec-
tors for the purpose of presenting the ASME code to governing
bodies of all states and cities.38 It is now possible for an author-
ized shop to build a boiler or pressure vessel that will be accept-
ed anywhere in the United States or Canada after it has been
inspected by an inspector holding a National Board Commis-
sion. 39 Therefore, it is customary for users of pressure vessels to
order ASME code vessels. This insures that such vessels will be
designed, fabricated, and inspected in compliance with a safe
standard as well as an accepted standard. 40 The State of Ohio
requires unfired pressure vessels to comply with Section VIII of
the ASME code; in addition, however, the shop inspectors must
have a commission from the State of Ohio as well as from the
National Board.
41
According to the regulations, repair or alteration of ASME
code vessels may be made in any shop that manufactures ASME
code vessels, or in the field by any welding contractor qualified
to make repairs on such vessels. Recognizing the broad applica-
tion of welding in repair work, The National Board of Boiler and
37 Fish, E. R.; Objectives of the ASME Boiler Code Committee, National
Board Bulletin (October 1944).
38 Greene, Arthur M., Jr., History of the ASME Boiler Code (American So-
ciety of Mechanical Engineers, 1955).
39 Myers, C. 0., The National Board and Its Functions in Jurisdiction and
Uniformity. Proceedings of Eighteenth General Meeting (National Board
of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors, 1948).
40 Myers, C. 0., The National Board Inspection and Stamping, National
Board Bulletin (April 1956).
41 The National Board Inspection Code. The National Board of Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Inspectors (1954).
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Pressure Vessels Inspectors has approved a set of rules called
The Recommended Rules for Repair of Power Boilers and Un-
fired Pressure Vessels by Welding.42 These, combined with rules
for riveted repairs, are intended to apply only to used vessels
and pressure vessels. Many states have adopted these rules as
part of their boiler and pressure laws. However, before repairs
are made on any ASME code boiler, the method of repair must
be approved by an authorized inspector. The inspector will ex-
amine the vessel, identify the material to be welded, and com-
pare it with the material to be used in repair. He will then make
sure that the welding contractor or shop has a qualified welding
procedure for the material being welded, and that the welder
who does the job is properly qualified to weld that material.
The operation of a hyperbaric chamber is also subject to the
many restrictions set down in city or state regulations relating to
ownership, operation, and building of hospitals. In Ohio (Section
2919.18, Ohio Revised Code) the Board of County Commissioners
is granted the authority to inspect a public or private hospital
within its jurisdiction. Again, under Section 3703.01 of the Re-
vised Code, the Department of Health is directed to inspect all
public or private institutions such as sanitariums and hospitals
and to condemn all unsanitary or defective plumbing, or order
such changes in the method of construction in drainage and ven-
tilation, as well as in arrangement of the plumbing appliances,
as are necessary to insure the safety of the public health. How-
ever, the Department, by virtue of the same statute, shall not
exercise any authority in municipal corporations or other politi-
cal subdivisions in which ordinances have been passed or resolu-
tions or regulations have been adopted and are being enforced
by the proper authorities regulating plumbing or prescribing the
character thereof.
Section 4103.06 (Ohio Revised Code) provides that when a
person desires to manufacture a special type of boiler, the design
of which is not covered by the rules of the Industrial Commis-
sion, he shall submit drawings and specifications of such a boiler
to the Commission, which may permit its installation. As an ex-
ample, in several jurisdictions, the code demands adequate ven-
tilation of the operating theaters and prohibits recirculation of
air. This one factor may exert considerable influence upon con-
42 "The National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspector Organizes,"
Power (February 15, 1921).
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struction of chambers. In this jurisdiction, it is obvious that one
must examine many separate and varied provisions of the state
and municipal codes in order to determine whether an intended
facility fulfills all statutory requirements.
Hyperbaric Chamber Operation-Hospital Liability
As there are no current statutory or code regulations for
the operation of a hyperbaric facility within the hospital, one
may look to administrative regulations promulgated by the De-
partment of Labor of the State of New York.
There are bills before Congress to amend the Food, Drug
and Cosmetics Act in order, among other things, to assure the
safety, efficiency, and reliability of therapeutic, diagnotic, and
prosthetic devices. If passed, the Food and Drug Administration
will apply to devices the same regulations now prevailing for
approval of new drugs.
Under Section 505, manufacturers would have to file an ap-
plication for the approval of every new product before manufac-
turing and marketing, stating:
(1) Investigators reports whether device is safe and effec-
tive,
(2) Details of construction and principles of operation,
(3) Methods and controls of manufacture,
(4) Samples of the device,
(5) Specimens of labeling.
In effect, HR 6788 and S 2580 which embody these provi-
sions, seek to provide for preview of all new medical devices,
and subjects them to the similar screening as new drugs.43
Of interest is the first appeal from a decision of the Food
and Drug Administration contesting the supremacy of Article
III Section 8 of the ...... Commerce among the several states"
clause of the United States Constitution over the Fifth Amend-
ment- ". . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law," provision of the Fifth Amendment. This
is an effort to strike down the recent amendments to the Pure
Food and Drugs Act upon a constitutional challenge. The Indus-
trial Code, Rule No. 22 entitled "Work in Compressed Air" is set
43 Wasmuth, Carl E.: Physician's Liability When Using New or Experi-
mental Drugs, 31 Cleveland Clinic Quarterly 61 (1964).
May, 1965
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1965
HYPERBARIC MEDICINE AND LAW
down by the State of New York, Department of Labor. These
regulations delineate the responsibilities of the owner, and regu-
late the general operation of such pressure facilities, including
the work periods, rest periods, and decompression time. These
rules also contain special provisions in regard to such matters as
regulating the compressors, lighting, fire prevention and first-aid.
In addition, the National Fire Protection Association Com-
mittee on Hospitals has codified specifications relative to com-
pressed gases as well as ventilation in the operating room. It is
readily apparent that the operation of the hyperbaric facility
comes within the purview of many statutes, regulations, and ad-
ministrative rules dealing with varied aspects of the problem. It
is suggested that the Committee on Hospitals of the National
Fire Protection Association, or the Hyperbaric Committee of the
National Academy of Sciences, set down a model code for the
operation and maintenance of hyperbaric facilities. Should any
legal action be instituted against a physician or hospital, the
evidentiary weight and sufficiency of such a code would be most
helpful in defense.
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